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Abstract — We have previously reported [1] the results of an 
exploratory analysis of the potential gains in detection 
capability from using diverse AntiVirus products. The analysis 
was based on 1599 malware samples collected from a 
distributed honeypot deployment over a period of 178 days. 
The malware samples were sent to the signature engines of 32 
different AntiVirus products hosted by the VirusTotal service. 
The analysis suggested significant gains in detection capability 
from using more than one AntiVirus product in a one-out-of-
two intrusion-tolerant setup. In this paper we present new 
analysis of this dataset to explore the detection gains that can 
be achieved from using more diversity (i.e. more than two 
AntiVirus products), how diversity may help to reduce the “at 
risk time” of a system and a preliminary model-fitting using 
the hyper-exponential distribution. 
Keywords-component; security assessment; anti-virus 
engines; malware; empirical assessment 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
All systems, including those built from off-the-shelf 
components, need to be sufficiently reliable and secure in 
delivering the service that is required of them. There are 
various ways in which this reliability and security can be 
achieved in practice: use of various validation and 
verification techniques in the software construction phases, 
issuance of patches and service releases for the product in 
operation, as well as the use of software fault/intrusion 
tolerance techniques. Fault tolerance techniques can range 
from simple “wrappers” of the software components [2] to 
the use of diverse software products in a fault-tolerant 
system [3]. This latter strategy of implementing fault 
tolerance was historically considered prohibitively 
expensive, due to the need for developing multiple bespoke 
software versions. However, the wide proliferation of off-
the-shelf software for various applications has made the use 
of software diversity an affordable option for fault tolerance 
against either malicious or non-malicious faults.  
Intrusion-tolerant architectures that employ diverse 
intrusion detection systems for detecting malicious 
behaviour have been proposed in the past [4]. A more recent 
publication [5] has also detailed an implementation of an 
AntiVirus platform that makes use of diverse AntiVirus 
products for malware detection. A similar architecture that 
uses diverse AntiVirus email scanners has been 
commercially available for several years [6]. Therefore, 
architectural solutions for employing diverse detection 
engines (either IDS or AntiVirus products) are already 
known and in some cases commercially deployed. Studies 
that provide empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of 
diversity for detection of malware and intrusions are, on the 
other hand, much more scarce.  
The following claim is made on the VirusTotal site [7], 
[8]: “Currently there is not any solution which provides 
100% detection rate for detecting viruses and malware”. 
Given these limitations of individual AntiVirus engines, 
designers of security protection systems are interested in at 
least getting estimates of what are the possible gains in terms 
of added security that the use of diversity (e.g. diverse 
AntiVirus products) may bring for their systems. 
In this paper we aim to address this research gap. We 
performed an analysis of the effects of diversity taking 
advantage of real-world data, namely the information 
provided by a distributed honeypot deployment, SGNET [9], 
[10]. We analysed 1599 malware samples collected by the 
SGNET distributed honeypot deployment over a period of 
178 days between February and August 2008. For each 
malware sample, we studied the evolution of the detection 
capability of the signature-based component of 32 different 
AntiVirus products and investigated the impact of diversity 
on such a capability. Through daily analyses of the same 
sample using the most up-to-date signature database 
available for each AV product, we were able to study the 
evolution of the detection capability over time.  
Utilising this dataset, we have reported previously [1] 
results which analysed the detection capabilities of the 
different AntiVirus detection engines and potential 
improvements in detection that can be observed from using 
two diverse AntiVirus detection engines. We observed that 
some AntiVirus products achieved high detection rates, but 
none detected all the malware samples in our study. We also 
found many cases of regression in the detection capability of 
the engines: cases where an engine would regress from 
detecting the malware on a given date to not detecting the 
same malware at a later date. When using two diverse 
detection engines we saw significant improvements in the 
detection capability. 
In this paper we present new analysis of our dataset. We 
have quantified the possible gains in malware detection from 
using more than two diverse engines. We also analysed the 
dataset in the time dimension to quantify the extent to which 
the use of diverse AntiVirus engines reduces the “at risk 
time” of a system. Finally we observe that a hyper-
exponential model seems a very good fit for the probability 
of observing zero-failure-rate systems as we add more 
diverse AVs. 
The evaluation proposed in this paper is defined upon a 
simplified view, which we consider sufficient to the 
accomplishment of our goals. We do the following:  
• We take into consideration a single type of 
component appearing in most AntiVirus products, 
namely the signature-based detection engine. 
• We perform the analysis on unambiguous malicious 
samples, samples that are known to be malicious 
executable files according to the information 
provided by the SGNET dataset. 
• We consider as a successful detection any alarm 
message provided by the component. We do not try 
to diagnose the “correctness” of the generated alarm 
message. 
While the resulting measures may not be representative 
of the full detection capability achieved by the real-world 
operation of the various AV products, they provide an 
interesting analysis of the detection capability of the 
respective signature-based sub-components under the stated 
conditions. Also, the purpose of our study is not to rank the 
individual AntiVirus engines, but to analyse the benefits of 
diversity that a user may observe from improved detection 
rates of using more than one AntiVirus product.  
For the sake of brevity, in the rest of the paper we will 
use the short-hand notation AV to refer to the signature-
based component of an AntiVirus detection engine. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section II 
details the experimental architecture used to collect the data; 
section III details empirical analysis of the benefits of 
diversity with AntiVirus products; section IV provides 
details of a hyper-exponential model which proved to be a 
very good fit to the probability of having a system with an 
observed zero failure rate when we increase the number of 
AVs in a diverse system; section V presents a discussion of 
the results and limitations on the claims we can make about 
the benefits of diversity and the limitations of the dataset we 
have used; section VI reviews two recent implementations 
that employ diverse AntiVirus engines for detecting malware 
or scanning malicious emails and also discusses other related 
work; and finally section VII contains conclusions and 
provisions for further work 
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND ARCHITECTURE1 
The construction of meaningful benchmarks for the 
evaluation of the detection capability of different AntiVirus 
products is an open debate in the research community. 
Previous work [11] underlined the challenges in correctly 
defining the notion of “success” in the detection of a specific 
malware sample. Also, modern AntiVirus products consist of 
a complex architecture of different types of detection 
components, and achieve higher performance by combining 
                                                          
1
 This section is similar to section II written in [1]. It is given here 
to help the reader follow the analysis of the results that succeeds 
this section. 
together the output of these diverse detection techniques. 
Since some of these detection techniques are also based on 
analysing the behavioural characteristics of the inspected 
samples, it is very difficult to set up a benchmark able to 
fully assess the detection capability of these complex 
products. 
This work does not aim at being a comprehensive 
benchmark of the detection capability of different products to 
the variety of Internet threats. Instead, we focus on a 
medium-sized sample set composed of a specific class of 
threats. 
The analyzed dataset is composed of 1599 malware 
samples collected by a real world honeypot deployment, 
SGNET [9], [10]. SGNET is a distributed honeypot 
deployment for the observation of server-side code injection 
attacks. Taking advantage of protocol learning techniques, 
SGNET is able to fully emulate the attack trace associated 
with code injection attacks and download malware samples 
that spread using server-side exploits. By deploying many 
sensors in different networks of the Internet, SGNET collects 
in a central dataset a snapshot of the aggregated observations 
of all its sensors. We use this data as input to our analysis 
and we build our analysis upon a limited, but realistic dataset 
with respect to the modern trends for a specific class of 
malware (i.e. malware associated with code injection 
attacks). 
The SGNET information enrichment framework [11] 
enriches the information collected by the deployment with 
additional data sources. Two sources are relevant to this 
work: the behavioural information provided by Anubis
2
 [12], 
[13] and the detection capability information provided by 
VirusTotal [7]. 
Every malware sample collected by the deployment is 
automatically submitted to Anubis to obtain information of 
its behaviour once executed on a real Windows system. This 
information is useful to filter out corrupted samples collected 
by the deployment, which would not be executable on a real 
system. Such samples proved to be the cause of ambiguities 
in the detection capability [11]: it is unclear whether such 
corrupted samples should or should not be detected since 
different engines often follow contradicting policies. 
The foundations of our analysis are derived from the 
interaction of SGNET with the VirusTotal service. 
VirusTotal is a web service that allows the analysis of a 
given malware sample by the signature-based engines of 
different AntiVirus vendors
3
. All the engines are kept up-to-
date with the latest version of the signatures. Thus, a 
submission of a malware sample to VirusTotal at a given 
point in time provides a snapshot on the ability of the 
different signature-based engines to correctly identify a 
threat in such samples. It is important to stress that the 
detection capability evaluation is performed on a subset of 
the functionalities of the detection solutions provided by the 
different vendors.  
Every time a sample is collected by the SGNET 
deployment it is automatically submitted for analysis to 
                                                          
2 
http://anubis.iseclab.org/ 
3 
In our study we evaluated the outputs of 32 AVs. 
VirusTotal, and the corresponding result is stored within the 
SGNET dataset. To get information on the evolution of the 
detection capability of the engines, each sample, for this 
dataset, is resubmitted on a daily basis for a period of 30 
days. 
The dataset generated by the SGNET interaction has 
some important characteristics that need to be taken into 
account in the following detection capability evaluation.  
Firstly, all the malware taken into consideration have 
been pushed to the victim as a consequence of a successful 
hijack of its control flow. We can thus safely consider that all 
the analyzed samples are a result of a malicious and 
unsolicited activity. 
Secondly, all the considered samples are valid Windows 
Portable Executable files. All these samples run successfully 
when executed against a Windows operating system. 
Thirdly, the malware samples are differentiated based 
solely on their content. Thus, the frequent usage of 
polymorphic techniques (an example of which is given in 
[14]) in malware propagation is likely to bias the number of 
malware samples collected. Through polymorphism, a 
malware modifies its content at every propagation attempt: 
two instances of the same malware thus appear as different 
when looking solely at their content.  
Finally, interdependence exists between the submission 
of a sample to VirusTotal and the observed detection 
capability. The VirusTotal service actively contributes to the 
AntiVirus community by sharing with all the vendors all the 
submitted samples resulting in improved detection rates 
across different AV engines. 
III. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF AV DIVERSITY 
We use the dataset introduced in the previous section to 
perform a detection capability analysis of 32 different AVs 
when subjected with the 1599 malware samples collected by 
the SGNET deployment. Exploiting the submission policy 
implemented in the SGNET dataset, we have considered for 
each sample the submissions performed on the 30 days 
succeeding its download. The input to our analysis can thus 
be considered as a series of triplets associating together a 
certain malware sample, an AV product and the identifier of 
the submission day with respect to the download date 
{Malwarei, AVj, Dayk}. For each of these triplets we have 
defined a binary score: 0 in case of successful detection, 1 in 
case of failure. Table I shows the aggregated counts of the 0s 
and 1s for the whole period. As previously explained, we 
have considered as success the generation of an alert 
regardless of the nature of the alert itself. 
TABLE I.  THE COUNTS OF SUCCESSFUL DETECTIONS AND FAILURES 
FOR TRIPLETS {MALWAREI, AVJ, DAYK} 
Value Count 
0 – no failure / detection 1,093,977 
1 –  failure / no detection 143,031 
 
For a number of technical reasons in the interaction of 
the SGNET dataset and VirusTotal a given malware and an 
AV are not always associated to 30 triplets. In the 
observation period we have some missing data since some 
AVs have not been queried on a given day. 
A. Summary of Single AV Results 
Table II lists the top 10 performing AVs
4
 ranked by their 
observed failure (non-detection) rates
5
. The difference 
between the failure rate values in the second column and in 
the fourth column is dependent on the definition of a unique 
“demand”. 
For the failure rates calculated in the second column, a 
unique demand is a {Malwarei, Dayk} pair, i.e. each malware 
sent on a different day is treated as unique. Hence the 
maximum number of demands is the product of the number 
of distinct malware (1599) and the number of days that an 
AV product is sent this malware (maximum of 30 days), i.e. 
1599 * 30 = 47,970.  
For the failure rates calculated in the fourth column, 
unique demands are the 1599 malware samples. In this case, 
a successful detection by an AV product AVj of a given 
malware sample Malwarei happens when AVj successfully 
detects Malwarei on all the dates in which it has inspected 
this malware. 
 From the results in Table II we can see that there is 
substantial variability in the detection capability of the top 10 
AVs. 
TABLE II.  TOP 10 AVS BY THEIR FAILURE (NON-DETECTION) RATES 
For all instances of 
malware 
For all distinct malware 
AV Name Failure rate AV Name Failure rate 
AV-7 2.7E-04 AV-7 6.3E-04 
AV-16 4.5E-04 AV-17 1.3E-03 
AV-17 5.9E-04 AV-6 2.5E-03 
AV-32 1.0E-03 AV-26 5.0E-03 
AV-26 1.5E-03 AV-21 6.3E-03 
AV-2 1.5E-03 AV-15 8.8E-03 
AV-6 1.8E-03 AV-22 8.8E-03 
AV-30 2.5E-03 AV-16 1.0E-02 
AV-22 3.2E-03 AV-19 1.0E-02 
AV-21 3.2E-03 AV-23 1.0E-02 
 
Table III shows the count of single versions within a 
given band of failure rate when we calculate their average 
failure rate for all instances of malware in our dataset 
(47,970 demands).  
We can see that 6 AV products are performing very 
badly for this dataset: they fail for more than 10% of all the 
demands sent to them. It is inconceivable that any system 
administrator would choose AVs that have such a bad 
detection rate to be used in their system. Hence we decided 
to remove the 6 worst performing AVs from further analysis. 
The decision was also influenced by our goal to make any 
                                                          
4
 The AV names have been anonymised to prevent concerns 
deriving from the comparison of commercial products. 
5
 Any mention of “failure rates” in this section refers to the 
observed (empirical) failure rates calculated from our dataset.  
results of the benefits of diversity appear fairer. A criticism 
that can be made if these 6 worst performing AVs are 
included in the analysis is that improvements in detection 
capability through the use of diversity will of course be 
higher if you have such poorly performing individual AVs in 
the mix. By removing them we make our estimates of the 
benefits of diversity more conservative. 
TABLE III.  COUNTS OF SINGLE AVS PER FAILURE RATE BAND 
Failure rate (f.r.) 
Count (and % of the 
total) of single AVs 
failure rate = 0 0 (0%) 
1.0E-05
 
≤ f. r. <1.0E-04 0 (0%) 
1.0E-04
 
≤ f. r. <1.0E-03 3 (9.37%) 
1.0E-03
 
≤ f. r. <1.0E-02 13 (40.63%) 
1.0E-02
 
≤ f. r. <1.0E-01 10 (31.25%) 
1.0E-01
 
≤ f. r. <1.0 6 (18.75%) 
Total single AVs 32 
B. Summary of Diverse AVs Results 
We now look at the benefits that using more than one AV 
may bring in terms of detection behaviour. The analysis is 
based on the 26 top-performing individual AV products. The 
observed failure rates are calculated from a maximum of 
47,970 demands, as explained in the previous section.  
Table IV gives the results for all the possible distinct 1-
out-of-n systems that can be built from these 26 AV 
products. 
TABLE IV.  COUNTS OF DIFFERENT 1-OUT-OF-N SYSTEMS OF AVS PER 
FAILURE RATE BAND. ABBREVIATION: F.R. - FAILURE RATE 
Bands f. r. = 0 
1.0E-05 
≤ f. r.< 
1.0E-04 
1.0E-04 
≤ f. r.< 
1.0E-03 
1.0E-03 
≤ f. r.< 
1.0E-02 
Total 
number 
of systems 
Proportion 
of systems 
with perfect 
detection 
1oo2 80 40 74 131 325 0.246154
1oo3 1,353 395 528 324 2,600 0.520385
1oo4 10,985 1,617 1,882 466 14,950 0.734783
1oo5 57,033 4,161 4,142 444 65,780 0.867026
1oo6 216,199 7,333 6,382 316 230,230 0.939057
1oo7 641,030 9,227 7,383 160 657,800 0.974506
1oo8 1,547,183 8,506 6,532 54 1,562,275 0.990340
1oo9 3,114,327 5,817 4,395 11 3,124,550 0.996728
1oo10 5,306,587 2,951 2,196 1 5,311,735 0.999031
1oo11 7,724,287 1,082 791 0 7,726,160 0.999758
1oo12 9,657,234 272 194 0 9,657,700 0.999952
1oo13 10,400,529 42 29 0 10,400,600 0.999993
1oo14 9,657,695 3 2 0 9,657,700 0.999999
1oo15 7,726,160 0 0 0 7,726,160 1 
 
The total number of systems in each configuration (the 
penultimate, right-most column of Table IV) is obtained 
using the combinatorial formula 
n
Cr. For example, the total 
number of 1-out-of-2 (1oo2) systems that you can create 
from 26 different AVs is 
26
C2 = 325, and so on. For each of 
these distinct systems we calculate the average failure rate 
for all instances of malware sent to them. The table only goes 
as far as 1-out-of-15 because we had no single demand that 
caused 15 different AVs to fail simultaneously. Hence from 
1oo15 onwards we observe perfect detection with our 
dataset. 
The first column of the results (f.r. = 0) shows the 
numbers of systems of each configuration that perfectly 
detected all the malware on all the dates that they inspected 
them. We had no single AV that was in this category (as 
evidenced in Table III), but this number grows substantially 
as the number of AVs in a diverse configuration increases 
(you can see its proportional growth to all the systems in a 
particular configuration on the right-most column of Table 
IV). The second column (1.0E-05 ≤ f. r. < 1.0E-04) shows 
the number of systems whose average failure rate for all 
instances of malware is between 10
-4
 and 10
-5
. The worst 
case failure rate band for any diverse setup is 10
-2
 and 10
-3
. 
In Table III we saw that the worst case failure rate band, 
even after filtering away the 6 worst single AVs, for any 
single AV is 10
-1
 and 10
-2
. Hence, for this dataset, we can 
interpret this result as “the worst diverse configuration 
brings an order of magnitude improvement over the worst 
single AV product”. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
of the failure rate achieved for single and multiple AV 
configurations. We can clearly observe the shift of AV 
performance towards a lower failure rate when adding extra 
layers of diversity (i.e. additional diverse AVs). 
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Figure 1.  Cumulative distribution of failure rate for different 
configurations 
C. “Diversity over Time” Analysis 
As we stated before, each malware sample was sent to a 
given AV product on several consecutive days after it was 
first uncovered in the SGNET honeypots. This period was a 
maximum of 30 days in our dataset. By their very nature 
signature-based AVs should eventually detect all the 
malware, provided the vendors write the appropriate 
signatures to detect them. However the response time for 
writing these signatures can differ significantly. Hence we 
analysed to what extent the use of diverse AVs may help a 
system reduce its “at risk time”, i.e. the time before a 
signature is available for a new malware. By using more than 
one AV the system is only exposed for the time it takes the 
fastest of the vendors to define the signature.  
Figure 2 shows a contour plot of the entire dataset of the 
26 AVs in our study. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The “at risk time” in number of days for each of the 26 AVs on 
each of the 1599 malware samples in our dataset. 
The x-axis lists the 26 AVs ordered from left to right 
based on the detection rate: from the highest detection rate to 
the one with the lowest. The y-axis contains a listing of all 
1599 malware. The z-axis values are given by the intensity 
of the colour on the plot, which is given by the legend on the 
side of the plot. The black coloured lines are associated with 
malware that were never seen by a given AV (i.e. the 
missing data): in our dataset these are associated with just 
one AV product. The white lines are associated with 
malware which were always detected by given AV product. 
The values 1-30 in the z-axis, represented by colours ranging 
from intense green to light pink, are associated with the 
number of days that a given AV failed to detect a given 
malware in our study, but which eventually were detected. 
The red lines represent the malware which, in our collection 
period, were never detected by a given AV product. 
The graph shows clear evidence of diversity, which 
explains the results we have observed so far.  
We now look in more detail at the most “difficult” 10% 
of malware (i.e. the ones which were most often missed 
overall by the AV products). This is shown in Figure 3. Note 
that this not a zoom of the top-most 10 % of the Figure 2, 
because the ordering is done over the malware. The ordering 
is bottom-to-top, from the most difficult to detect to the least 
difficult (within this 10% of malware). 
If we look at the graph along the x-axis it is clear again 
that there are infrequent cases of a line (i.e. a particular 
malware) running across the different AVs with the same 
colour. This indicates that even for malware which, on 
average, different AVs are finding difficult to detect, there is 
considerable variation on which ones they find difficult (i.e. 
a malware which an AV finds difficult another one does not, 
and vice versa) and when they do fail, their at risk time does 
vary. Hence it is clear that using diverse AVs, even in the 
cases when different AVs fail to detect the malware, can 
have an impact in reducing the “at risk time” of a system: the 
time the system is at risk is the minimum time it takes any of 
the diverse AVs employed to detect the malware. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The “at risk time” in number of days for each of the 26 AVs 
when considering the 160 most “difficult” Malware samples. 
Another viewpoint of the time dimension analysis is 
given in Figure 4. For each AV we looked at the time (in 
number of days) it took to detect a given malware sample. 
To make the graph more readable we categorised these times 
into: always detected (shown on the bars filled in white 
colour with black borders), never detected (shown in red fill 
colour), no data (in black fill colour), and then several 5-day 
groupings (1-5 days, 6-10 days etc.). Each bar shows the 
proportion of malware that are in any of these categories. We 
are only showing the top 45% in the y-axis, as all AVs 
always detected at least 55% of all the malware samples sent 
to them. 
Figure 4 allows us to look more clearly at the empirical 
distribution of the time it takes each AV to detect the 
malware samples in our study. Along the x-axis the AVs are 
ordered left-to-right from the AV with the lowest at risk time 
(AV-7) to the highest (AV-5). 
The distribution of detection times may have a bearing on 
the choice of AVs that a given user may wish to make for a 
given system. Rather than choosing the “best on average”, 
users may choose the AVs that do not have too many 
undetected malware (shown in red colour in the bars of the 
graph in Figure 4). For example, even though AV-23 has a 
better (shorter) average “at risk time” than AV-18, it is 
evident from Figure 4 that AV-18 has a shorter red coloured 
section of the bar compared with AV23. This means AV-18 
failed to detect, in our study, a smaller number of malware 
than AV-23, even though its total at risk time was worse 
(higher).  
From the viewpoint of diversity analysis, the choice of 
which set of AVs to choose is therefore not only influenced 
by the highest detection rates (diversity in “space”) but also 
the time it takes the different AVs to detect malware 
(diversity in “time”). Different AV vendors may have 
different policies on deciding which malware they prioritise 
for a signature definition. Therefore the needs of an 
individual end-user for whom a definition of a signature for a 
particular malware sample is of high importance, may 
mismatch with the AV vendor’s prioritisation of that 
malware. So use of diverse AVs helps avoid this “vendor 
lock-in”. Selection of diverse AVs to optimise the diversity 
in time aspect requires we choose AVs from vendors that 
exhibit diverse policies at prioritising signature definitions 
for different malware. 
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26-30 days non-detected Never detected No data  
Figure 4.  “At risk time” distribution for single AVs 
IV. MODELLING THE IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL AVS 
An interesting characteristic of the data shown in Table 
IV is the asymptotic reduction in the proportion of 
“imperfect” systems, (i.e. systems that fail on one or more of 
the malware). A simple exponential model of the decrease 
with the number of AVs (N) in the diverse system would 
estimate the proportion as: 
 
P(faulty | N) = p
N
 
 
where p is the probability that a single AV fails to detect all 
the malware.  
In practice this proved to be a very poor fit to the 
observed proportions. However an empirically derived 
hyper-exponential model of the form: 
 
P(faulty | N) = (p
N
) 
N/2
 
 
proved to be a remarkably good fit to the observed data as 
shown in the Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5.  Effect of increasing diversity by adding AVs 
The results show that the proportion of imperfect systems 
decreases far more rapidly than a simple exponential 
distribution would indicate. For example, increasing N from 
8 to 10 decreases the chance of having a 1ooN system that 
fails by an order of magnitude. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Confidence on the Best Case Observed Failure Rate 
Any claim on the best case (i.e. lowest) failure rate we 
can hope for, using this dataset, will be in the region of 10
-4
 
to 10
-5
. This is because we have a maximum of 47,970 
demands sent to any given AV (as we explained earlier). 
This is the upper bound on the observed failure rate. To 
make claims about lower failure rates (i.e. smaller than 10
-5
) 
we need more data – or, in other words, we must do more 
testing. The theoretical background behind these intuitive 
results is given in [15]
6
. 
But the fact that we are seeing only, for instance, 5 out of 
almost 10 million different combinations of 1oo14 systems 
fail on this dataset is telling us something about the 
improvements in detection rates from using diversity (cf. 
Table IV), even if we cannot claim a failure rate lower than 
10
-5
. We may interpret the 0.999999 proportion of 1oo14 
systems with a perfect failure rate as a 99.9999% confidence 
we have in the claim that, for this dataset, “the average 
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 Section III of [15] contains a discussion of the limits on claims 
we can make about reliability when statistical testing reveals no 
failures. Both classical and Bayesian inference methods are 
described. 
failure rate of a 1oo14 diverse AV system constructed from 
randomly selecting 14 AVs from a pool of 26 AV products, 
will be no worse than ~  4.7 * 10
-5
”. This may or may not 
persuade a given system administrator to take on the 
additional cost of buying this extra security: this will clearly 
depend on their particular requirements. But in some cases, 
especially regulated industries, there may be a legal 
requirement to show actually achieved failure rates with a 
given level of confidence. It may not be feasible to 
demonstrate those failure rates with the associated 
confidence for single AV products without extensive testing. 
The claim above is limited by the level of diversity we 
can expect between various diverse configurations. We 
“only” have 26 AV products (even though this may represent 
a large chunk of the available commercial solutions 
available). Hence, for instance, even though we have over 
65,000 different combinations of 1oo5 systems using 26 
AVs, the level of diversity that exists between these different 
1oo5 systems may be limited in some cases. For example, a 
1oo5 system which consists of AV1, AV2, AV3, AV4 and 
AV5, is not that much different from a 1oo5 system 
consisting of AV1, AV2, AV3, AV4 and AV6. Hence care 
must be taken from generalising the level of confidence from 
these large numbers without considerations of these subtle 
concepts on the sample space of possible systems. 
B. Limitations of the Study and the Dataset 
There are two major limitations of the dataset we have 
used which prevent us from making more generalised 
conclusions on the possible benefits of diversity.  
The first is to do with the time in which the data has been 
collected. As we mentioned before the malware samples in 
our study were collected from the SGNET network in 2008, 
hence these malware samples do not accurately reflect the 
current prevalence of malware in 2011. However we should 
stress that we are matching like with like: i.e. malware 
samples and AVs at some snapshot in time, in this case 2008. 
We plan to do further work with malware which are 
prevalent in 2011 and the detection capabilities of 2011 AVs 
when they inspect these malware. This will give us results on 
the consistency, or not, of the detection capabilities of 
diverse AVs in different snapshots in time. 
The second limitation is due to the nature of the data set: 
we only have confirmed malware. Hence we can measure 
failure to detect genuine malware (false negatives), but we 
could not measure cases where benign files are incorrectly 
identified as malware (false positives). False positive rate is 
an important measure when evaluating the effectiveness of 
any detection system, including AV systems. Of course we 
could have artificially created a large set of non-malicious 
files which we could have sent to the AV systems and 
obtained false positive rates this way. But this can just as 
easily be criticised due to the lack of representativeness of 
the chosen non-malicious files. Choosing representative test 
loads and defining what constitutes a false positive is a 
matter of some debate in the AV community (see discussion 
in [10] and [11] for more details). We plan to study the false 
positive aspects in future work. 
C. Discussion of the Hyper-Exponential Model 
There is no immediate explanation for the surprisingly 
good fit of the 1ooN system detection capability to the 
hyper-exponential model, but we suspect it is related to the 
Central Limit Theorem where individual variations are 
smoothed out to produce a normal distribution (for a sum of 
distributions), or a log-normal distribution (for the product of 
distributions). In our case, the hyper-exponential distribution 
could be intermediate between these two extremes. 
Furthermore, it might be that the asymptotic nature of 
exceedances and extreme values can be used to justify a 
general hyper exponential or Gumbel distribution. This is an 
area that requires more investigation. 
If the hyper-exponential distribution is shown to be 
generic, it would be a useful means for predicting the 
expected detection rates for a large 1ooN AV system based 
on measurements made with simpler 1oo2 or 1oo3 
configurations. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
A. Architectures that Utilise Diverse AntiVirus Products 
In this paper we have presented the potential gains in 
detection capability that can be achieved by using diverse 
AVs. Security professionals may be interested in the 
architectures that enable the use of diverse AV products. 
The following publication [5] has provided an initial 
implementation of an architecture called Cloud-AV, which 
utilises multiple diverse AntiVirus products. The Cloud-AV 
architecture is based on the client-server paradigm. Each host 
machine in a network runs a host service which monitors the 
host and forwards suspicious files to a centralised network 
service. This centralised service uses a set of diverse 
AntiVirus products to examine the file, and based on the 
adopted security policy makes a decision regarding 
maliciousness of the file. This decision is then forwarded to 
the host. To improve performance, the host service adds the 
decision to its local repository of previously analysed files. 
Hence, subsequent encounters of the same file by the host 
will be decided locally. The implementation detailed in [5] 
handles executable files only. A study with a deployment of 
the Cloud-AV implementation in a university network over a 
six month period is given in [5]. For the executable files 
observed in the study, the network overhead and the time 
needed for an AntiVirus engine to make a decision are 
relatively low. This is because the processes running on the 
local host, during the observation period, could make a 
decision on the maliciousness of the file in more than 99% of 
the cases that they had to examine a file. The authors 
acknowledge that the performance penalties might be 
significantly higher if the types of files that are examined 
increases as well as if the number of new files that are 
observed on the host is high (since the host will need to 
forward the files for examination to the network service 
more often). 
Another implementation [6] is a commercial solution for 
e-mail scanning which utilises diverse AntiVirus engines. 
B. Other Related Empirical Work with AV Products 
Empirical analyses of the benefits of diversity with 
diverse AV products are scarce. CloudAV [5] and our 
previous paper [1] are the only examples we know of 
published research. 
Studies which perform analysis of the detection 
capabilities and rank various AV products are, on the other 
hand, much more common. A recent publication [8] reports 
results on ranking of several AV products and also contains 
an interesting analysis of “at risk time” for single AV 
products. Several other sites
7
 also report rankings and 
comparisons of AV products, though one must be careful to 
look at the criteria used for comparison and what exactly was 
the “system under test” to compare the results of different 
reports. 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis proposed in this work is an assessment of 
the practical impacts of the application of diversity in a real 
world scenario based on realistic data generated by a 
distributed honeypot deployment. As shown in [11], the 
comprehensive performance evaluation of AntiVirus engines 
is an extremely challenging, if not impossible, problem. This 
work does not aim at providing a solution to this challenge, 
but builds upon it to clearly define the limits of validity of its 
measurements. 
The performance analysis of the signature-based 
components showed a considerable variability in their ability 
to correctly detect the samples considered in the dataset. 
Also, despite the generally high detection rate of the 
detection engines, none of them achieved 100% detection 
rate. The detection failures were both due to the lack of 
knowledge of a given malware at the time in which the 
samples were first detected, but also due to regressions in the 
ability to detect previously known samples as a consequence, 
possibly, of the deletion of some signatures. 
The diverse performance of the detectors justified the 
exploitation of diversity to improve the detection 
performance. We calculated the failure rates of all the 
possible diverse systems in various 1-out-of-n (with n 
between 2 and 26) setups that can be obtained from the best 
26 individual AVs in our dataset (we discarded the worst 6 
AVs from our initial set of 32 AV products, as they exhibited 
extremely poor detection capability). The main results can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Considerable improvements in detection rates can be 
gained from employing diverse AVs; 
• No single AV product detected all the malware in 
our study, but almost 25% of all the diverse pairs, 
and over 50% of all triplets successfully detected all 
the malware; 
• In our dataset, no malware causes more than 14 
different AVs to fail on any given date. Hence we 
get perfect detection rates, with this dataset, by using 
15 diverse AVs; 
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• We observe a law of diminishing returns in the 
proportion of systems that successfully detect all the 
malware as we move from 1-out-of-8 diverse 
configurations to more diverse configurations;  
• Significant potential gains in reducing the “at risk 
time” of a system from employing diverse AVs: 
even in cases where AVs fail to detect a malware, 
there is diversity in the time it takes different 
vendors to successfully define a signature for the 
malware and detect it;  
• The analysis of “at risk time” is a novel contribution 
compared with traditional analysis of benefits of 
diversity for reliability: analysis and modelling of 
diversity has usually been in terms of demands (i.e. 
in space) and the time dimension was not usually 
considered; 
• An empirically derived hyper-exponential model 
proved to be a remarkably good fit to the proportion 
of systems in each diverse setup that had a zero 
failure rate. We plan to do further analysis with new 
datasets and if the hyper-exponential distribution is 
shown to be generic, it would be a useful means for 
predicting the expected detection rates for a large 
1ooN AV system based on measurements made with 
simpler 1oo2 or 1oo3 configurations. 
There are several provisions for further work: 
• As we stated in the introduction, there are many 
difficulties with constructing meaningful 
benchmarks for the evaluation of the detection 
capability of different AntiVirus products (see [11] 
for a more elaborate discussion). Modern AntiVirus 
products comprise a complex architecture of 
different types of detection components, and achieve 
higher detection capability by combining together 
the output of these diverse detection techniques. 
Since some of these detection techniques are also 
based on analysing the behavioural characteristics of 
the inspected samples, it is very difficult to setup a 
benchmark capable to fully assess the detection 
capability of these complex components. In our 
study we have concentrated on one specific part of 
these products, namely their signature-based 
detection engine. Further studies are needed, with 
other more up to date datasets, to test the detection 
capabilities of these products in full, including their 
sensitivities to false positives (whatever the 
definition of a false positive may be for a given 
setup); 
• Studying the detection capability with different 
categories of malicious files. In our study we have 
concentrated on malicious executable files only. 
Further studies are needed to check the detection 
capability for other types of files e.g. document files, 
media files etc; 
• Analysis of the benefits of diversity for “majority 
voting” setups, such as 2oo3 (“two-out-of-three”) 
diverse configurations for example. Since our dataset 
contained confirmed malware samples, we thought 
detection capability is the most appropriate aspect to 
study: a system should prevent a malware from 
executing if at least one AV has detected it as being 
malicious (hence our emphasis on 1-out-of-n setups). 
But in cases where false positives become an issue, 
using majority voting may help curtail the false 
positive rate;  
• More extensive exploratory modelling and 
modelling for prediction. The results with the hyper-
exponential distribution were a pleasant surprise, but 
more extensive analysis with new datasets is 
required to make more general conclusions. 
Extensions of current methods for modelling 
diversity to incorporate the time dimension are also 
needed. 
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